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empirically minded and naturalistically inclined post-Cartesian philosophers have 
refused to accept the idea that we human persons are immaterial, senseless souls. 
This rejection has led to a fragmentation of the self and eventually to its theoretical 
disappearence. a way to resist this eliminativist trend is to see the self as an embodied 
entity, a promising thesis which has assumed prominence in contemporary debates. The 
paper is a (fairly partisan) reconstruction of this post-Cartesian scenario.
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1.1. I Have no Hands
“i will think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds, and all 
the external things are no different from the illusions of our dreams […]. i 
will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, and no 
senses, but yet as falsely believing that i have all these”.1
this is, of course, a well-known passage from descartes’ meditations: an evil 
spirit is perhaps deceiving the author – and the reader, and all of us: we have 
no hands, no senses, no body, and ‘our little life is rounded with a sleep’. 
but there is no evil spirit, and the sky, the air, and the bodies are there 
where we think they are, created by a perfectly good god. this is the 
conclusion that, eventually, the meditations come to.   
and yet, for descartes, there is a clear sense, the strictest sense, according to 
which we indeed have no body and no senses, neither flesh nor blood. “I find in 
myself faculties of thinking in various specific ways – namely the faculties of 
imagination and sensation – without which i can understand myself clearly and 
distinctly as a whole”.2 imagination and sensations do not belong to the whole 
of me, as it were: i have sensations and i see images of various sorts, but these 
‘sensuous thoughts’ are generated by faculties that do not exist in myself. i myself 
do not have the passive faculty of sensation, and i am not a sensible thing at all: i 
am an ‘intellectual’ substance, a soul or a mind, which is really distinct from the 
body which i call mine.
this is not to say that we, human persons are not stricly united to a 
material body and that emotions and sensations are not a pervasive part 
of our lives. on the contrary, descartes says, the passions of the soul, such 
as perceptions, sensual love, hatred, wonder, melancholy, joy, desire and 
various bodily feelings are eveywhere; and for some it can even be difficult 
to conceive of ourselves as devoid of these kinds of experience which would 
seem to be the actual constituents of our very humanity. but not so. a 
human person is identical with an immaterial soul, and, for example, it is 
‘rational love’ alone that properly belongs to it, a ‘pure’ form of love which is 
not generated by any bodily movement. 
descartes’ real self, the mind/soul, is therefore completely outside the 
physical order of nature and it is strikingly different, as a metaphysical 
principle, from ‘aristotelian souls’. it is a pure immaterial and rational 
1  descartes (2008), p. 16.
2  descartes (2008), p. 56.
sense anD sUBjeCtIvItY. a veRY shoRt – anD PaRtIaL –  
hIstoRY of the Loss anD ReCoveRY of the BoDILY seLf
alFredo tomaSetta università  degli Studi di Bergamo
1.  From a 
Senseless Self to a 
Selfless World
257
substance and not the form of the body, which – according to aristotelians – 
bestows on the body itself not just the power of rational thinking but also its 
vegetative and animal life.
Many scholarly cautions notwithstanding, it is indeed quite difficult to 
avoid the notorious image of the ghost in the machine when one thinks of 
descartes’ selves.
now, there have been, in post-cartesian philosophy, many ghost-friendly 
thinkers, happy to admit immaterial spirits – or perhaps transcendental 
egos – and to identify us with them; these ‘idealist’ philosophers will not be 
my concern here.
i will instead deal with the empiricist and naturalist tradition which felt, 
and feels, uncomfortable with immaterial souls and the like: cartesian – 
or Kantian – selves are too rarefied, too thin, to content down-to-earth 
temperaments; and yet, if human persons are not simple, senseless souls, 
what are they? if not souls, and not bodies – descartes’ ban has been a 
powerful one – well, perhaps nothing at all. and indeed, in the naturalistic 
field, so the story has gone.
1.2. Nothing but Consciousness, and Perhpars Nothing at All
according to descartes, we are immaterial thinking substances and we 
persist through time exactly when the same immaterial substance exists at 
different times. locke disagreed.
that is not to say that according to locke thinking does not concern human 
persons; on the contrary, he famously wrote that “a person is a thinking 
intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as 
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does 
only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it 
seems to me, essential to it”. 3
So, according to this picture, there are thinking things and these are 
persons. but locke, the empiricist, is not able to establish the nature of 
these thinking substances: “We have the ideas of matter and thinking, 
but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being 
thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own 
ideas, without revelation, to discover whether omnipotency has given 
to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, 
or else, joined and fixed to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial 
substance”.4
3  locke (1975), p. 335.
4  locke (1975), p. 542.
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So, as far as knowledge is concerned, thought and consciousness are 
properties of substances whose material or spiritual nature is beyond our 
reach. and yet, it would seem, we are identical with these mysterious subjects 
of experience. but, somewhat surprisingly and somewhat incoherently, locke 
is not of this opinion: these subjects of experience cannot be identical with 
human persons because they have different identity conditions. Suppose ‘the 
bearer’ of my thinking is actually a soul: according to locke, i could acquire 
a new soul and my soul could become the soul of someone else: our identity 
as person does not depend upon the identity of any thinking substance.  
Sameness of substance, locke says, does not concern personal identity at all: 
the same substance without the same consciousness no more makes the same 
person: “consciousness alone makes self - nothing but consciousness can 
unite remote existence into the same person: the identity of substance will 
not do it”.5
So we are something like a continuous stream of consciousness which, 
at least in principle, could be transferred from one thinking substance 
to another. We belong, as it were, to a pure realm of ideas, and are quite 
separate from the substances that we happen to inhabit.
according to locke, one cannot know whether cartesian souls do exist, but 
this does not threaten the knowledge we have of ourselves: we are, one could 
almost say, our own experiences, and these are certainly not beyond our 
epistemic possibilities. the cartesian ghost is separate from ourselves, and 
we are identified with a non-substantial stream of ideas.
but are we really a stream of consciousness? not exactly, said hume: what is 
there consists, more properly, of a flux. “Setting aside some metaphysicians 
[…] I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but 
a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other 
with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement”.6
It is worth noting that this Humean flux is composed of many particular 
mental states which seem to be substances on their own, capable of 
separate existence and in no need of a material body or an immaterial soul 
as their ‘support’. “all our particular perceptions […] are different, and 
distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately 
considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to 
support their existence”.7 
the mind, hume says, is constituted by many different perceptions and there 
5  locke (1975), p. 344.  
6  hume (1978), p. 252.
7  hume (1978), p. 252.
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is no place for a simple, enduring individual to whom these perception 
belong - even though there is a clear and inevitable propensity to feign the 
continued existence of an invariable substance: myself. 
So one could say that hume goes further than locke in denying the very 
existence of a thinking, though mysterious, substance; but, nonetheless, in 
the humean picture we do exist and in a somewhat lockean form: at every 
moment of our personal lives there is a certain collection of perception 
and this collection is nothing but a stage in the sparkling flux of mental 
events that is to be identified with a person persisting in time. Not quite so, 
however. 
according to hume it is a mistake to think that an object can gain or lose 
a part. gaining a part brings something new into existence, losing a part 
brings the object under consideration to an end, and one should not confuse 
the relation of strict identity with the relation of similarity, which holds 
between successive objects ‘born’ after the loss or the gain of a part by a 
previously existing object. So the collection of perceptions that exists at 
one time is never identical with the collection of perceptions that exists one 
moment later: in a flux, many perceptions change, and so there cannot be 
strict identity. if a person has to be something capable of persistence over 
time, then, it seems, one should conclude that there are no persons after all.
and the idea suggests itself that there are not even instantaneous persons. 
indeed, in the humean picture, a person existing at a certain time should 
probably be viewed as a collection of perceptions existing at that time. but even 
that is problematic: hume is quite clear in saying that these collections are 
bundles of separate items, with no real bond among them. So if an instantaneous 
person is something endowed with a unitary mental life, it seems that one 
should conclude that there are not even instantaneous persons. 
hume’s Treatise, i think, directly suggests these radical conclusions, but we 
should note that hume himself did not unambiguously state these unsettling 
ideas. contemporary humeans have not been so cautious.
2.1. The Way of Cognitive Science 
“the no self alternative” is the telling title of a recent paper by the neuro-
psychologist and philosopher Thomas Metzinger; and it is no surprise to find 
in it an approving mention of hume’s ‘bundle theory of the self ’.8 
metzinger considers hume’s position as a prominent example of a non-substan-
tialist approach to the nature of the self, and according to him denying the sub-
8  metzinger (2011) , p. 282. the core ideas of metzinger’s two books, Being no-one (metzinger 
2004) and The ego Tunnel (metzinger 2009), are usefully summarized in this article.
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stantiality of the self is no different from denying its very existence. i think the 
last point is far from obvious, but let us concede it for present purposes.
metzinger thinks that hume’s model of the self, indeed hume’s elimination 
of the self is on the right track and that present-day cognitive neurosci-
ence offers an empirically adequate account and a vindication of these old 
philosophical intuitions. according to him there is a common experience 
of something like a self-subsistent enduring entity, a self, forming a non-
exchangeable and irreducible part of the world, a ‘nugget of reality’. but this 
‘phenomenology of substantiality’, by itself, has no metaphysical value, and 
the principle of parsimony demands a deflationist explanation of such a 
phenomenology, an explanation that, following hume, accounts for our ten-
dency to feign a fictional and stable character behind the flux of thoughts. 
contemporary cognitive science, metzinger holds, offers such an explana-
tion and such an account.
“all technical details aside […] science offers conceptually clear models of 
functional mechanisms which could parsimoniously explain the integration 
of individual property-representations into a unified self-representation. 
this theoretical model requires no transcendental subject to stand behind 
the appearance of ‘a’ self as consciously represented, because it gradually 
emerges out of the self-organizing interaction between a large number of 
simpler components. this possibility […] simply was not available to thinkers 
in the past, it is a novelty in the history of ideas. […] dynamical self-organi-
zation is a new theoretical option for the bundle theorist”.9  
there is a representation of a substantial self, metzinger claims, but not the sub-
stantial self itself: nothing in the available scientific data obliges us to posit per-
sons as unchangeable bearers of mental states – and metzinger, a paradigmatic 
naturaliser, is implicitly suggesting that science has to be the measure of all 
things.
 Such an attitude is by no means rare in the contemporary science of mind, 
and one of its well-known champions is certainly daniel dennett, who, of 
course, thinks there are no persons at all.
 the centrepiece of dennett’s eliminativist strategy is a theory of the mind 
based on a sustained and empirically based critique of the so-called ‘myth of 
the cartesian theatre’ – empirically minded scholars very much like pick on 
descartes. 
 Neuro-cognitive sciences, Dennett believes, have finally dispelled this an-
cient myth, namely the idea of an ‘interior boss’, the controller of the body 
9  metzinger (2011), p. 282.
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and the privileged, cartesian viewer of all mental states which play their 
roles on the stage of our mental theatre. this tenacious myth still has a 
strong persuasive force, but contemporary cognitive sciences have, at last, 
allowed us the resources to free ourselves from it. What they teach us is 
that the brain’s processes are parallel and distributed ones, and there is no 
place in the brain where it all comes together. What happens is that some 
processed bits of information sometimes gain a more or less stable ‘cerebral 
celebrity’: temporary, in-the-limelight goings-on which have no guarantee 
of keeping their privileged position in the Humean flux of the mind/brain’s 
activities. these temporary ‘celebrities’ constitute a sort of linear order, a 
brain narrative whose main character is what dennett calls “the virtual 
captain”. and this character is represented by the narrative as a substantive 
cartesian boss, but really it is nothing: its illusory existence is just the prod-
uct of the brain’s impersonal processes. “if asked what a centre of gravity was 
made of [physicists] would say, ‘nothing’”;10 the virtual captain, the seeming 
self, is - dennett says - a centre of narrative gravity, and if one asked what a self 
is, one should reply as physicists do in the case of physical centres of gravity: 
“nothing at all”.  but if the self is nothing but a centre of narrative gravity 
– and so, dennett says, nothing at all –, what about what we think of as our 
introspected selves? From dennett’s perspective, clearly, no substantial self 
is the object of a special interior faculty called “introspection”: there is just 
a usefully deceptive mental representation of a unitary subject, allegedly 
responsible for the actions of complex cognitive systems – a misleading and 
yet convenient illusion, and nothing more.
the main points of the theory just outlined are summed up in this notable pas-
sage, which introduces some more powerful metaphors, the very trademark of 
dennett’s style of thinking: “in our brains there is a cobbled-together collection 
of specialist brain circuits, which thanks to a family of habits inculcated partly by 
culture and partly by individual self-exploration, conspire together to produce 
a more or less orderly, more or less effective, more or less well-designed virtual 
machine, the Joycean machine.  […] this virtual machine, this software of the brain, 
performs a sort of internal political miracle: it creates a virtual captain of the 
crew”.11
2.2. The Way of Philosophy
contemporary cognitive science, we have just seen, has lent us empirical 
arguments for the theoretical elimination of subjects from the book of the 
10  dennett (1991), p. 95.
11  dennett (1991), p. 228.
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world. but the humean attitude has been alive, and indeed dominant, even 
in the strictly philosophical field, or at least in the philosophical tradition 
which has been closer to empirical sciences, namely analytic philosophy. 
Indeed, in the last forty years or so, Derek Parfit’s ideas – in which there are 
distinct echoes of hume – have been a true landmark for every analytic phi-
losopher trying to make sense of the puzzles of personal identity.  
 As is well-known, Parfit is a very sophisticated thinker and the intricacy of 
his discussions is not always open to a straightforward interpretation. nev-
ertheless an eliminativist reading of his ideas is quite easy, and i think quite 
correct.
 According to Parfit we use the language of personal identity when we think 
there is an appropriate psychological continuity: we say, for example, that 
the person who is now writing this paper is the same person who was writ-
ing it ten minutes ago because between the mental lives of these ‘two’ per-
sons there is a relation of psychological continuity.
 now consider the following case, concerning three identical twins. “my 
division. my body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two brothers. 
my brain is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body 
of one of my brothers. each of the resulting people believes that he is me, 
seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every other 
way psychologically continuous with me. and he has a body that is very like 
mine”.12 
What happens to me after the transplant? there seem to be only three pos-
sibilities.
(1) given that the criteria of personal identity we actually use are grounded 
in psychological continuity, it seems that i should be identical with at least 
one of the two persons – let us say a and b – existing after the surgery. but 
my psychological continuity with a is the same as that i have with b.  Why 
should i be one of the two, and not the other?
(2) one could then think that i am identical with both a and b; but if so, 
since a and b are different, a and b would be at the same time identical and 
different persons, which is of course impossible.  
So (3) perhaps i have not survived the transplant. and yet, if half of my brain 
had been successfully transplanted and the other half destroyed, i would 
have survived, i would have been a for example. but, if this is so, how is it 
possible that the mere existence of b prevents me from existing? a double 
success cannot be such a failure: if creating a grants my survival, why on 
earth should the creation of a and B cause my death?
12  Parfit (1984), p. 253.
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 there is no way out, it seems, even though the question concerning my 
survival and identity after the transplant is perfectly clear and, plausibly, 
it should have a perfectly determinate answer. Parfit disagrees on the last 
point: “we are naturally inclined to believe that our identity must always be 
determinate. We are inclined to believe, strongly, that this must be so. i […] 
argue that this natural belief cannot be true unless we are separately exist-
ing entities”13 namely unless we are something like a cartesian soul.
 Therefore, if there are no Cartesian souls – as Parfit thinks –, then there will 
be cases in which questions about our persistence over time do not have a 
determinate answer. the ‘my division situation’ is one of these cases. “We 
know what this outcome [i.e.: the transplant’s outcome] is. there will be 
two future people, each of whom will have the body of one of my brothers, 
and will be fully psychologically continuous with me, because he has half of 
my brain. Knowing this, we know everything. i may ask: ‘but shall i be one 
of these two people, or the other, or neither?’ but i should regard this as an 
empty question”.14 
 So, according to Parfit, even an omniscient being could not give a definite 
answer to the question concerning my survival in the transplant case, and 
this is so because there is no fact of the matter to be known. this is, indeed, 
a quite bewildering idea because it suggests that the world itself could be 
indeterminate with regard to my existence. but things are not exactly like 
this, i think. 
As I understand what Parfit is saying, the world cannot be indeterminate 
with regard to my existence and this is because, in a strict and literal sense, 
there is no such thing as myself. the whole of reality is completely describ-
able in an impersonal way, and nothing in this description can be identified 
with a person. to be sure, one talks about persons and their identity over 
time, and there are certain criteria of correctness for such talk. in many 
cases it is possible, at least in principle, to talk about persons and their per-
sistence through time in a correct and determinate way; but there are cases 
– such as the ‘my division situation’ – that are “not covered by the criteria 
of personal identity that we actually use”.15 In such cases, Parfit suggests, 
questions concerning the continued existence of people are empty and so 
unanswerable, and we should simply abandon the language of identity. yet 
the world, a selfless world, is perfectly determined. “Buddha would have 
agreed”, Parfit writes,16 and referring to a classical buddhist source he ap-
13  Parfit (1984), p. 216.
14  Parfit (1984), p. 258-259.
15  Parfit (1971), p. 3. 
16  Parfit (1984), p. 272.
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provingly quotes: “o brethren, actions do exist, and also their consequences, 
but the person that acts does not”.17
 at this point one noteworthy thing has to be underlined. the contemporary 
eliminativist theories we have discussed so far seem to share an implicit 
assumption: a human person, if it exists, has a ‘purely mental’ nature and, 
in particular, it cannot be identified with a living body.18 in this respect, 
hume’s heirs agree with a fundamental tenet of cartesian philosophy: the 
self is not a bodily self, if it exists at all - and Metzinger, Dennett and Parfit 
say it does not. but perhaps one could avoid the disappereance of people, of 
ourselves, simply by restoring our forgotten material dimension. let us look 
at two recent ways of doing exactly this.
3.1. Mind and Body: The Quasi-Identity Theory
a human person cannot be identical with a living body, or so many philoso-
phers think, offering an argument along the following lines. Suppose i am in-
deed identical with my living body; so i should exist exactly where and when 
my body exists as a living organism. (but if my brain is seriously and irrepa-
rably damaged, my body can still exist although there is no longer a person: i 
myself have disappeared. a body does not essentially have a mental life; i do. 
So i, the person, am not identical with my body. 
and yet i am intimately related to a body: indeed, when my brain is irrepa-
rably damaged i disappear. So what relationship might there be between me 
and my body?
constitution theorists have a surprising answer:19 a human person is consti-
tuted by a human body to which the person itself is not identical. here is the 
usual – and useful – analogy: a piece of marble constitutes a statue but the 
statue is not identical with it; in fact, if they were identical, they would have 
the same persistence conditions: neither could exist without the other; but 
they have different persistence conditions: the piece of marble can change 
its form and can exist without constituting a statue, and the statue can 
change many parts and can exist without being constituted by the original 
piece of marble. So a statue and the piece of marble that constitutes it are 
not identical. and the same holds for my body and myself. When a piece of 
marble is suitably shaped, and perhaps is suitably related to an artworld, a 
new thing, a statue, comes into existence. When a human organism comes 
to a suitable degree of biological development it constitutes a new thing, a 
17  Parfit (1984), p. 501.
18  this assumption is indeed explicit in metzinger (2011), p. 281. 
19  among the ‘constitutionalists’ one may recall baker (2000, 2007), corcoran (2006), Johnston 
(1987, 1997), and Shoemaker (1999).
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person, which is essentially endowed with a sophisticated mental life. and it 
can happen that, when the constituting organism is seriously damaged, the 
person disappears, no longer constituted by a suitable organism.
the picture that emerges is therefore quite peculiar. on the one hand, per-
sons are essentially thinking beings distinct from any material body. on 
the other hand, however, human organisms constitute persons who are in-
timately related to material bodies, so intimately that one can correctly as-
sign to a human person a spatial location, just as we do with statues. consti-
tution theorists look for a duality without dualism, as it were, a fascinating 
and seemingly impossible compromise between our rational nature and our 
bodily roots. this sounds like a miracle and indeed it has attracted its share 
of (rational) disbelievers.
 consider, to begin with, the mental life of a human person. this is the men-
tal life of an entity which is distinct from the organism that constitutes it 
and so, it seems, the organism itself, in the strictest sense, has no mental 
life. but why should this be so? a fully developed human organism seems 
able to think in every respect: it appears to have all the thought-enabling 
features one would expect; and yet, the constitution theory says, these fea-
tures are just sufficient conditions for constituting a different entity which 
is the unique owner of a personal mental life. this sounds quite implausible. 
on the other hand, if one concedes that human organisms are indeed able 
to think, then we have two distinct thinkers, the organism and the person it 
constitutes. and this is even worse. So the constitution theorist seems to be 
forced to defend the odd thesis according to which a fully developed human 
organism is unable to think.
 but now consider non-human animals, such as cats, dogs, cows, and so 
forth. everybody agrees that these animals, these living organisms, are in-
deed endowed with a mental life, although (probably) not the mental life of 
a person. So there are thinking organisms after all, and excluding fully devel-
oped human organisms from thinking seems a rather dubious move.
 at this point one could perhaps suppose that human organisms are indeed able 
to think: they simply do not have personal mental lives, but nevertheless they 
do have perceptions, feelings, desires, and possibly an elementary ability to rea-
son. if so, however, what would the relationship between these animal thoughts 
and the mental life of the person constituted by the animal be? Should we say 
that humans have a ‘broken’ mental life – perceptions and feelings belonging to 
the animal and, say, theorising belonging to the person? or should we say that 
when the animal constitutes a person its mental life is ‘transferred’ in some way 
to the person? these are not exactly promising ideas. 
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but even setting aside this metaphysical maze, a fundamental question re-
mains to be answered: when, why and in which cases something constitutes 
something else? my parrot has never mimicked a human voice; but suppose 
that from tomorrow on it recites “the Waste land” for two years. does the 
parrot constitute a new entity for two years, the reciter, which is essentially a 
speaking being? Perhaps not, one would say. but why? constitution theorists 
have been quite elusive on questions like this.20
3.2. Animals
constitutionalists say i am not an organism, even though i am intimately 
related with the human animal that constitutes me: a fascinating view, to be 
sure, but also a perplexing one.  So one could maybe prefer an obvious alter-
native: i am not constituted by a human animal, i am simply identical with 
it. this is what so-called ‘animalists’ maintain.21
 are all persons identical with human animals according to this view? not 
necessarily. if god, angels, and a certain kind of alien do exist, they are per-
sons but not human animals. 
 and notice: biologically alive human organisms in a permanent vegetative 
state, whose mental capacities are permanently destroyed, are certainly hu-
man animals but not persons – if a person is to have certain mental qualities 
such as rationality, self-consciousness, memory and so on. So not every hu-
man organism is a person, animalists say. 
 this point, however, seem very puzzling indeed. the human organism to 
which i am identical could exist without being a person – if, for example, it 
enters a permanent vegetative state; so i could exist without being a per-
son; but this, one would think, is certainly absurd: whenever i exist i am a 
person, i am essentially a person; how could animalists deny this? they can. 
animalism is precisely the view according to which people like you and me 
are identical with thinking organisms and therefore we are not essentially 
thinking beings; just as a former president of the United States can exist 
without being a president, so you and i can exist without a personal mental 
life and without being a person.
 “but”, so the protest goes, “surely i am not a mere animal!”. human persons 
cannot be animals, it is said, because in many respects they are absolutely 
special beings. they compose quartets, have complicated love affairs, write 
novels, discover bosons and are rational and morally responsible beings – 
20  One can find a sustained critique of the constitution theory in Olson (2007).
21  Prominent animalists are merricks (2011), olson (1997), Snowdon (1990), and van inwagen 
(1990, 2007, 2008).
sense anD sUBjeCtIvItY. a veRY shoRt – anD PaRtIaL –  
hIstoRY of the Loss anD ReCoveRY of the BoDILY seLf
alFredo tomaSetta università  degli Studi di Bergamo
267
they can be so, at least. how could an animal be like that? this line of argu-
ment i think – and animalists think so as well – is rhetorically quite strong 
but not exactly a very compelling one. We may simply be very peculiar 
animals, and nothing more: our being special – an undeniable feature of us – 
does not call for a special metaphysical status. And indeed in an unreflective 
mood we seem obviously inclined to admit that we are animals; we ordinar-
ily say that we have hands, we are sitting on the chair, we get fat and so on 
and so forth; but, of course, human animals too have hands, sit on chairs 
and get fat: it seems no coincidence. animalism, after all, seems like a sen-
sible and down-to-earth idea.
 and yet consider this case. your cerebrum is put into another head and the 
being who gets that organ is mentally continuous with you: she has your 
memory, your feelings, your tastes, and so forth. She is you, one would say. 
So you have gone along with your transplanted cerebrum while no animal 
has moved from one head to another. therefore you are not an animal. 
many people, and many philosophers have found this argument inescapable: 
animalism must be false. but animalists have an answer.22 in ordinary life 
we are mainly interested in the mental lives of people and, ordinarily, when-
ever there is the same mental life, there is the same person. but this does 
not hold on every occasion. in extraordinary cases, such as the cerebrum 
transplant, a mental life is transferred from a person to another: there are 
one mental life and two persons. metaphysically speaking, a kidney trans-
plant is no different, even though, of course, the cerebrum case makes for a 
dramatic practical difference (our interest will shift from the donor to the 
recipient).
i think this is a quite convincing reply, and, more generally, i think animal-
ism is quite a convincing idea. if you are skeptical about cartesian souls and 
transcendental egos, and if you want to avoid our theoretical disappear-
ance, you’d do best to admit we are robustly embodied things. and the most 
straightforward and promising thesis concerning our bodily nature is that 
we are identical with living bodies. or so i suggest, if you trust an animal 
like me. 
22  See olson (1997).
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